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Habeus Corpus-Right of State Prisoner to Seek Writ
in Federal Courts
When a North Carolina prisoner, during the course of his trial,
raises a constitutional question based on denial of due process, it is
well established that this question may be presented to the state supreme
court on appeal.' Upon failure to raise the question during the trial,
he may, by timely motion, move for a new trial 2 at which time the question may be raised. Only until recently, however, was there a "judicial
intimation" of the procedure which he should follow once he failed to
make such timely motion. This suggestion by the court was to petition
for a writ of error coram nobis. The uncertainty encompassing the
propriety of this petition has since been removed,4 and an old common
law writ of procedure has been revived, through which such questions
may now reach the state's highest court. But if relief is denied there,
then what?
It is settled law that state prisoners must exhaust their state remedies
before petitioning the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus, based
upon a question of due process; and where more than one procedural
remedy is available in the state court, only one need be exhausted before
relief is sought in the federal couits.5 What constitutes an exhaustion
of one's state remedies, however, has not been so clear.
In Fx parte Hawk8 it was held that the state remedy included an
application for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and that ordinarilya petition for a writ of habeas corpus would
not be entertained by the lower federal courts until all the state remedies
had been exhausted. The Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges
later proposed a statute, which since has been enacted into law, 7 in
which the Conference intended to incorporate this -Ioctrine. 8 Actually
the Conference intended that the statute should close the doors of the
IN.C. GEr. STAT. §15-180 (1943).

§§15-174, 1-207 (1943).
re Taylor, 229 N. C. 297, 49 S. E. 2d 749 (1948), Note, 27 N. C. L. REv.
254 (1949).
' State v. Daniels, 231 N. C. 17, 56 S. E. 2d 2 (1949) (application must be
made to the supreme court for permission to apply for writ in the superior court
in which case was tried) ; State v. Daniels, 231 N. C. 341, 56 S.E. 2d 646 (1949)
(petition must present prima facie substantial merit sufficient to bring it within
purview of writ) ; State v. Daniels, 232 N. C. 196, 59 S.E. 2d 430 (1950) (petition
must be based on matters "extraneous to the record").
'Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S.672 (1947) ; see Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F.
Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (where prisoner is in custody of one state for extradition to another, he need exhaust only the remedies of one state).
a321 U. S.114 (1944) ; accord, White v. Ragen, 324 U. S.760 (1945).
"62 STAT. 967 (1948), 28 U. S. C. §2254 (Supp. 1949) (Reviser's note-"This
new section is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court.").
'See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F. R. D. 171, 177 (1948)
("One of the incidents of the state remedy is right to apply to the Supreme Court
for certiorari.") ; accord, Holiday v. Maryland, 177 F. 2d 844 (4th Cir. 1949).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT.
3 In
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lower federal courts in all cases to state prisoners petitioning for a
writ of habeas corpus based on denial of due process,0 until the state
remedies had been exhausted, 10 except in cases where no adequate state
remedy was available. Eleven days prior to the passage of this statute
the Court, in Wade v. Mayo," handed down a decision contrary to its
holding in Ex parte Hawk, indicating that a petition for certiorari from
the judgment in the state court would no longer be a prerequisite to
the filing of an application for habeas corpus in the federal district
court.1 2 But recently in Darrv. Burford,3 the Court, when faced with
the new statute for the first time, interpreted it as requiring an application for certiorari to the Supreme Court before a prisoner may petition
a lower federal court, 1 4 except in cases of "exceptional circumstances."' 5
Although Wade v. Mayo was not overruled, the majority opinion made
it clear that any deviation in the Wade case from the now established
rule was to be abandoned.
Thus it seems that a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus
in the federal courts, must first petition the Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari. 5' But where does the prisoner stand when the Supreme
928 U. S. C. C. S. 1684 (1948) ; see Parker, supra note 7, at 178 (".... there
should be no more cases where proceedings of state courts, affirmed by the highest
courts of the state, with denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United
States, will be reviewed by federal circuit or district judges.").
10 62 STAT. 967 (1948), 28 U. S. C. §2254 (Supp. 1949) provides that a prisoner
"shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State . . . if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any
available procedure, the question presented."
11334 U. S. 672 (1948).
("Where it is apparent or even
12 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672, 681 (1948)
possible that such [denial] would be the disposition of a petition for certiorari
from the state court's judgment, failure to file a petition should not prejudice the
right to file a habeas corpus application in a district court.") ; accord, Miller v.
Hudspeth, 176 F. 2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949) (The court here says that an analysis
of Wade v. Mayo leads to the conclusion that a petition for writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court is not part of the state remedy and that 28 U. S. C. §2254 does
a different decision.).
not 12contain
(1950).would require
Ct. 587 which
70 Sup.anything
(1950). The court says that it is
594
Ct.
587,
70
Sup.
v.
Burford,
1, Darr
immaterial as a matter of terminology whether review in the Supreme Court is
considered a part of the state judicial process or a part of the federal procedure.
(conviction obtained by false
1' See White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1945)
testimony, and prisoner denied assistance of counsel); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U. S. 227 (1940) (confession obtained by coercion); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U. S. 278 (1936) (confession obtained by coercion and brutality); Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U. S.86 (1923) (trial conducted under influence of mob violence) ;
Sharpe v. Kentucky, 135 F. 2d 974 (6th Cir. 1943) (death sentence had been
imposed) ; Murphy v. Murphy, 108 F. 2d 861 (2nd Cir. 1940) (Court says, "'Exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency' alone can justify intervention" of a
federal district court.) ; but cf. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915) .(trial
conducted under influence of mob violence, but second trial conducted under different conditions and circumstances).
" Of course the prisoner may appeal as a matter of right where the question
involves the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision
is against its validity, or where the question involves the validity of a state statute
on the grounds that it is repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States and the decision is in favor of its validity. 62 STAT. 929 (1948), 28
U. S. C. §1257 (Supp. 1949).
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Court denies his writ? In Darrv. Burford the court refused to answer
this question. 16
It is universally recognized that res judicata does not apply to applications for writs of habeas corpus ;17 yet, upon filing a petition in the
district court for a writ of habeas corpus the record undoubtedly will
reveal the prior denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, and the
district court might well refuse to entertain the petition in the absence
of a new basis for relief. Should the petitioner find additional grounds
for his claim, it would then be mandatory that he start over in the
state courts, for he would not have exhausted his state remedies.,, This
procedural circle would therefore in effect, negative the habeas corpus
jurisdiction which the federal courts have had since 1867,10 and leave
the prisoner in somewhat of a dilemma.
The argument favoring inclusion of a petition for a writ of certiorari
from the final state judgment in the "state remedy" is based on the
preservation and amelioration of the doctrine of comity, which, as between the state and federal courts, has become "'a principle of right
and of law."'20 Those who would abolish certiorari as part of the "state
remedy," including the dissenters in Darr v. Burford, contend that the
final result of a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court must be one
of two unsatisfactory alternatives: either (1) the Supreme Court must
consider the case as if it had granted the request for certiorari, and its
decision be based on the merits of the case; or (2) the denial, as in
other cases, would have no legal significance. 2 ' It is readily apparent
that under the first alternative the work load of the Supreme Court
would become so burdensome that this alone makes such a procedure
prohibitive. 22 Whereas, under the second alternative the result would
"0TDarr v. Burford, 70 Sup. Ct. 587, 595 (1950).

" Darr v. Burford, 70 Sup. Ct 587 (1950) ; Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224
(1923) ; Rosso v. Aderhold, 67 F. 2d 315 (5th Cir. 1933) ; Carter v. McClaughry,

105 F. 614 (C. C. D. Ka. 1900).
"'Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F. 2d 498 (4th Cir. 1947), Note, 26 N. C. L.
REV.217 (1948).
"914 STAT. 385 c. XXVIII (1867), now incorporated into 62 STAT. 964 (1948),
28 U. S. C. §2241 (Supp. 1949), as amended, 63 STAT. 105 (1949), 28 U. S. C.
§2241 (Supp. 1950).
2 See Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S.176, 182 (1884).
21 Darr v. Burford, 70 Sup. Ct. 587, 607 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
" See Parker, supra note 7, at 172. "Statistics compiled by the Administrative

Office of the United States Courts show that in the years 1943, 1944, and 1945,
there were filed in the lower federal courts 1556 petitions by federal prisoners
and 1570 by state prisoners." 18 U. S. L. WEEic 3019 (July 5, 1949) and 3345
(June 20, 1950) gives the following statistical summary of the Supreme Court's
work, for the period 1946-1949:

October Term

1946

1947

1948

1949

Total cases
Cases disposed of

1524
1366

891
772

903
748

880
757

Cases remaining

158

119

155

123
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seem to amount to an unnecessary procedural delay caused by an absurd
prerequisite.
Yet, perhaps it is best that the Supreme Court be given the opportunity in every case to review the record on these important questions
of due process which so often involve fundamental rights. But, since a
denial of certiorari simply means that fewer than four members of the
court deemed it desirable to review a decision of a lower court, and in
no way is an adjudication on the merits, 23 the discretionary power of
the lower federal courts to entertain petitions for writs of habeas corpus
should not be disturbed. By keeping the doors of the lower federal
courts open the chances of injustice are thereby reduced to a minimum.
Therefore, if a state prisoner believes his case still has merit after
certiorari has been denied, he should not hestitate to petition the lower
federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus. But, if in the meantime, new
evidence has been 'discovered, then it would be advisable for him to first
seek a determination of24the question in the state court as suggested in
Stonebreaker v. Smyth.
Thus, it would seem, that if this procedure is left open for a state
prisoner to follow, not only will the doctrine of comity be promoted,
but also the benefits of the "great writ" will be preserved.
WILLIAm L. MILLS, JR.

Limitation of Actions-Effect of Part Payment of Principal
or Interest on Non-Paying Obligor
In North Carolina a part payment by one of a number jointly or
jointly and severally bound, will start the statute of limitations running
anew as to all others of the same class, 1 but if the payment is made
after the remedy is barred it will not bind those not making the pay2Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 71 Sup. Ct. 9 (1950); Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, 338 U. S. 912, 917 (1950) (denial of certiorari means "that fewer
than four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision of the
lower court as a matter 'of sound judicial discretion.' . . . The court has said
this /again, and again; again and again the admonition has to be repeated.").
24163 F. 2d 498 (4th Cir. 1947).
'Davis v. Alexander, 207 N. C. 417, 177 S. E. 417 (1934) (payment by

maker); Dillard v. Farmer's Mercantile Co., 190 N. C. 225, 129 S. E. 598 (1925)

(part payment by maker); Barber v. Absher Co., 175 N. C. 602, 96 S. E. 43
(1918) (part payment by maker); Houser v. Fayssoux, 168 N. C. 1, 83 S. E. 692
(1914) (part payment by principal) ; Garrett v. Reeves, 125 N. C. 529, 34 S. E.
636 (1899) (part payment by principal) ; Copeland v. Collins, 122 N. C. 619, 30
S. E. 315 (1898) (part payment by maker); Le Duc v. Butler, 112 N. C. 458,
17 S. E. 428 (1893) ; Moore v. Beaman, 111 N. C. 328, 16 S. E. 177 (1892) (part
payment by one obligor); Moore v. Goodwin, 109 N. C. 218, 13 S.E. 772 (1891)
(part payment by principal) ; Green v. Greensboro College, 83 N. C. 449 (1880)
(payment of interest by principal). See also MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcTICE AND PaOCEDURE §134 (1929).

